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I. INTRODUCTION

The Trump Administration’s trade strategy is unorthodox to
phrase it in the mildest terms. At no time since the modern international
trading system began with the founding of the World Trading
Organization (“WTO”) has the US government launched such a multipronged assault on the global trading system. 1 The Trump
Administration’s approach—as I have argued elsewhere 2—is, in my
view, quite dangerous for the global trading system and contrary to the
United States’ interests. The purpose of this Essay is to provide some
constructive analysis on how the Trump Administration, or another
* Jeffrey and Bettysue Hughes Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Center for
International and Comparative Law at Duke University. The Author would like to thank Rob
Howse and Simon Lester for their comments on the conference presentation. Sophia Duran
provided excellent research assistance.
1. Rachel Brewster & Sergio Puig, Introduction: Can International Trade Law Recover?,
113 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 38, 38-39 (2019).
2. Rachel Brewster, WTO Dispute Settlement: Can We Go Back Again?, 113 AM. J. INT’L
L. UNBOUND 61, 61-66 (2019); Rachel Brewster, The Trump Administration and the Future of
the WTO, 44 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 1 (2018).
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succeeding administration, could address the United States’ trade
concerns with other nations more productively.
This Essay begins by acknowledging that there are real and
serious concerns regarding Chinese government policies, particularly
in the areas of intellectual property and support for state-owned
enterprises. This work addresses how the United States could achieve
gains in Chinese trade relations without creating a threat to the broader
global trading system. This Essay’s perspective is based on the
recognition that the United States not only needs to be concerned about
its trading relationships today, but relations over the next twenty to fifty
years. The rules and structures of the current multilateral system—the
agreements making up the WTO—are overwhelmingly in American
interests. We largely created the WTO (along with the European
Communities, Japan, and Canada) at the height of our relative global
economic power in the 1990s. 3 The United States would never get a
global consensus around those same rules or procedures today.
Maintaining the stability of that system, respect for that system, and
compliance with that system has to be a top American economic
priority.
In the next twenty to fifty years, the economic power of the United
States will be very different from what it is today. China and India each
have four times the population of the United States: China’s 1.42
billion population and India’s 1.37 billion population dwarf the United
States’ population of 329 million. 4 These economies are currently large
but will soon be tremendously important exporting markets and
importing markets. American economic prosperity depends
significantly on keeping these countries invested in and constrained by
the multilateral system. Our concern with maintaining the multilateral
trade system’s rules and institutions means that we should not create
precedents today that will come back to bite us in a decade or two.
3. For a description of the bargaining that created the WTO and the use of US economic
power, see generally Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based
Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 56 INT’L ORG. 339 (2002).
4. See Population Div. of the Dep’t of Econ. and Soc. Affairs, World Population Prospects:
The 2017 Revision, Key Findings and Advance Tables, U.N. Doc. ESA/P/WP/248, available at
https://population.un.org/wpp/Publications/Files/WPP2017_KeyFindings.pdf
[https://perma.cc/379H-M3WM]; see also Conrad Hackett, Which 7 countries hold half of the
world’s population?, PEW RES. CTR. (July 11, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/
2018/07/11/world-population-day/ [https://perma.cc/X2ZT-HTB4] (noting that after China and
India, the next fie most populous countries do not have a combined population equal to India or
China).
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This does not mean that the United States cannot address real
trade issues where they exist. Concern for the future certainly does not
mean that we should be fearful to act. However, the United States needs
to be smart and sophisticated about the trade strategies it adopts. There
is a fair amount to be gained by trade negotiations but there is also a lot
that the United States can lose under the present Trump Administration
strategy.
With the goal of being constructive, this Essay offers four
concrete recommendations on how to improve the United States’ trade
strategy in the near term. They are briefly listed below and then
expanded on in the rest of the Essay:
1. The United States should frame its trade discussions with
China as being outside of current WTO issues. Taking the
discussion out of current trade agreements provides for more
negotiating freedom and preserves the integrity of the current
multilateral framework.
2. The United States should end its block on the appointment or
re-appointment of WTO Appellate Body members. The United
States is currently threatening the continued enforcement of
multilateral trade enforcement by cutting off its supply of judges. 5
Ending this enforcement crisis would create greater support for
broader US trade policies and restore confidence in the multilateral
system.
3. The United States should cease making its broad national
security claims used to justify the current steel and aluminum
tariffs. 6 Maintaining these claims creates a precedent for a major
loophole in trade law that other countries, particularly China,
could use in the near future.

5. Tom Miles, Trump threats, demands spark 'existential crisis' at WTO, REUTERS (Oct.
24, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-wto-insight/trump-threats-demandsspark-existential-crisis-at-wto-idUSKCN1MY12F [https://perma.cc/N78R-RNPY] (discussing
the Trump Administration’s block on appointing any new members to the WTO Appellate
Body); see also Jennifer A. Hillman, How to Make the Trade War Even Worse, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/17/opinion/trade-war-china-wto.html
[https://perma.cc/RDQ9-GFEV] (discussing the detrimental effects of the Trump
Administration trade policy).
6. Proclamation No. 9,704, 83 Fed. Reg. 11,619 (Mar. 8, 2018); Proclamation No. 9,705,
83 Fed. Reg. 11,625 (Mar. 8, 2018). For an analysis of the over-breath of the national security
claims, see Jennifer A. Hillman, Trump Tariffs Threaten National Security, N.Y. TIMES (July 1,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/01/opinion/trump-national-security-tariffs.html
[https://perma.cc/BQ67-6FCR].
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4. Re-engage the Transpacific Partnership countries and their
trade agreement. Since the United States withdrew from the
negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement
(“TPP”), the other member countries have concluded that
agreement—now called the Comprehensive and Progressive
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (“CPTPP”). 7 These
countries surround China, and their support is critical to seeing
Chinese trade reforms through.

Altering current American trade policy to incorporate these four
elements would allow the United States to challenge Chinese trade
policies while preserving the stability of the multilateral system. The
rest of this Essay discusses these recommendations in greater detail.
II. FRAMING US-CHINESE TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
The United States and China are currently engaged in an extensive
set of trade negotiations regarding subjects including trade sanctions
and counter-sanctions. 8 The United States currently has imposed
US$250 billion in trade sanctions against China, which has responded
by imposing its own US$110 billion in sanctions on US imports. 9 The
Trump Administration’s threat to further escalate trade sanctions by
US$260 billion was placed on hold after US and Chinese leaders agreed
to a truce in escalations at the G20 Summit in Argentina in December
2018. 10 Currently these disputes are characterized as involving WTO
issues, 11 but they could viably be framed as addressing issues outside
of the scope of the WTO rules.

7. Ernesto Londoño & Motoko Rich, U.S. Allies Sign Sweeping Trade Deal in
Challenge to Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/08/world/
asia/us-trump-tpp-signed.html [https://perma.cc/RZS2-A89A] (discussing the formation of the
CPTPP out of the countries that negotiated the TPP, minus the United States).
8. See Chad Bown & Melina Kolb, Trump’s Trade War: An Up-To-Date Guide,
PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (Sept. 24, 2018), https://piie.com/blogs/trade-investmentpolicy-watch/trump-trade-war-china-date-guide [https://perma.cc/JA7F-8ZEZ].
9. For a full accounting of the phases of retaliation and counter-retaliation, see id.
10. Mark Lander, U.S. and China Call Truce in Trade War, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/01/world/trump-xi-g20-merkel.html
[https://perma.cc/
MSP6-DVW4].
11. Ana Swanson & Eileen Sullivan, Trump Aims New Threat at China as Mnuchin Warns
of Trade War, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/06/us/
politics/trump-trade-policies.html [https://perma.cc/7WL9-GFKL] (discussing how the Trump
Administration describes China as cheating on trade and claiming that China is violating WTO
rules).
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The dispute between the United States and China involves a
number of issues, but one of the main drivers of the dispute is
intellectual property protection. 12 In particular, the US government
alleges that the Chinese government requires US firms to share
technology with Chinese firms in joint ventures as a condition of
investing in China. 13 This claimed conduct, often referred to as “forced
technology transfers,” is a major complaint of US industries. 14
This intellectual property claim arguably falls outside of WTO
rules because it engages an exception to China’s Accession Protocol to
the WTO. 15 That agreement, which allowed China to become a member
of the WTO in 2001, was very broad but arguably allowed China to
maintain some conditions on foreign investment (including joint
ventures), subject to limitations. 16 Those limitations were set out in
Section 7(3), which states in relevant parts that “China shall ensure that
. . . the right of importation or investment by national or subnational
authorities, is not conditioned on: . . . performance requirements of any
kind, such as . . . the transfer of technology, export performance or the
conduct of research and development in China.” 17 The question
becomes whether the Chinese government’s practice of urging US
firms to share technology with local firms is a de facto performance
requirement or simply encouragement. 18

12. Lingling Wei, U.S., China Negotiators Narrow Differences on Trade, WALL ST. J.
(Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-china-negotiators-narrow-differences-ontrade-11546959523 [https://perma.cc/6WCW-BAXE].
13. Allen Rappaport, Intellectual Property to Take Center Stage as Trump and Xi Meet,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/28/us/politics/intellectualproperty-trump-xi.html [https://perma.cc/WHG6-M7TR].
14. The major trade complaint involves these forced technology transfers but often
discussions of intellectual property in China also involve concerns about the actual theft of
intellectual property by Chinese state agents and the selective enforcement of intellectual
property laws within China. For an excellent overview of these issues, see the Trade Talks
Podcast, Trade Talks Episode 65: What Would a Trump-China Deal Look Like?, PETERSON
INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (Dec. 9, 2018), https://piie.com/experts/peterson-perspectives/tradetalks-episode-65-what-would-trump-china-deal-look [https://perma.cc/DL8E-9MA6]; see also
Rappaport, supra note 13.
15. Accession of the People’s Republic of China to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, WTO Doc. Wf/L/432 (Nov. 10, 2001).
16. Id.
17. Id. art. 7(3).
18. Thanks to Simon Lester for raising and discussing this issue with me. For a more
detailed analysis of the issue, see Simon Lester, Forced Technology Transfer and the WTO,
INT’L ECON. L. BLOG (Mar. 29, 2018), https://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2018/03/
forced-technology-transfer-and-the-wto.html [https://perma.cc/7NC2-ZJSU].
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Currently, the US government is somewhat vague about whether
it considers this dispute to be under WTO rules or not. In internal WTO
discussions, US representatives have generally maintained that they are
not claiming that China is breaching WTO rules, 19 but have simply
labelled China’s actions as unfair and discriminatory. 20 More
importantly, in public discussions, the Trump Administration has not
made an effort to mark this dispute as falling outside of the WTO limits.
Most observers probably do not know one way or the other whether the
United States is claiming China is violating existing global trade rules.
However, the fact that the United States has put US$250 billion in trade
sanctions on China probably leads most observers to believe that the
United States considers China to be in breach of trade rules.
As a result, the Trump Administration could gain significant
strategic ground by explicitly and loudly claiming that this dispute falls
outside of WTO rules and that it is a distinct issue from existing WTO
trade law. The first advantage would be gaining negotiating freedom
by moving the dispute out of the WTO. If the United States maintains
that China is breaching trade rules, then the entirety of the WTO would
have a stake in a negotiated outcome. This means that the WTO
membership would have to approve any new WTO agreement. 21 As
any observer of the WTO’s Doha Round of trade negotiations can
attest, it is very hard to achieve a consensus among WTO members;22
thus, this framing would provide more negotiating latitude.
19. See id. (highlighting the US Statement at the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body meeting
on March 27, 2018).
20. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE REPORT, UPDATE
CONCERNING CHINA’S ACTS, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES RELATED TO TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND INNOVATION 22 (2018) (describing these practices
as “unfair”).
21. If a US-China trade agreement provided for any deviations from existing WTO rules,
which is likely given the wide range of topics that the current negotiations are covering, then
the parties would have to receive a waiver from the WTO membership to not be in breach of
the WTO agreements. For a more detailed discussion of the procedures for receiving and
monitoring waivers under WTO rules, see generally James Harrison, Legal and Political
Oversight of WTO Waivers, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 411 (2008).
22. The WTO membership has had a notoriously difficult time achieving consensus on the
current round of trade negotiations, the Doha Round, that began in in 2001. See Raymond
Zhong & Peter Kenny, WTO Fails to Ratify Trade Agreement, WALL ST. J. (July 31, 2014),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-pressures-india-on-wto-trade-agreement-1406820288
[https://perma.cc/2DSS-BZHP] (discussing the most recent breakdown in Doha Round
negotiations in 2014); Frances Robinson, WTO Shifts Meeting Goals Amid Doha Stalemate,
WALL ST. J (Dec. 14, 2011) https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240529702038934045770
98511856526158 [https://perma.cc/RK36-XFWJ] (discussing the stalemates that lead to another
break down in negotiations in 2009).
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Second, this framing would preserve the integrity of the current
multilateral WTO system. One of the fundamental principles of the
WTO system is the multilateral resolution of trade disputes that cover
WTO issues. 23 Under the current unilateral US approach to trade
relations, the United States has not waited for a multilateral resolution
of trade disputes. Specifically, the Trump Administration has imposed
trade sanctions on China without authorization from the WTO, which
is itself a violation of WTO rules. 24 If this is a dispute over WTO issues,
such unilateralism is very detrimental to the multilateral system: it
creates a precedent where member appointing itself as judge, jury, and
execution of WTO law, displacing WTO legal procedures. By framing
this dispute as outside of the multilateral system, the United States can
protect the stability of the WTO system while maximizing its
bargaining leverage.
III. ENDING THE WTO APPELLATE BODY CRISIS
The second piece of reconstructing US trade policy would be to
end the US block on appointing or re-appointing members of the WTO
Appellate Body. 25 This practice has caused a crisis at the WTO
because, if it continues, the Appellate Body will not have its minimum
number of three members to hear cases as of December 2019. 26 One
former Appellate Body member, Ricardo Ramírez-Hernández, has
described the US approach as attempting to kill the Appellate Body

23. See Brewster, The Future of the WTO, supra note 2, at 4 (noting that “[t]he core of the
WTO law is not just a system of trade rules but a commitment to refrain from retaliating against
other WTO countries’ perceived trade law breaches until the alleged breaches have been
adjudicated, and then retaliating only to the extent allowed by WTO arbitration”).
24. See Brewster, WTO Dispute Settlement, supra note 2. The European Communities
have decided to request consultations with China at the WTO over the issue of technology
transfer. While this is detrimental to the American framing of this issue as outside of the WTO,
it is yet uncertain how far the European claim against China will proceed at the WTO. See Simon
Lester, New EU Consultations Request on (Alleged) Chinese Forced Technology Transfer, INT’L
ECON. L. BLOG (Dec. 20, 2018), https://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2018/12/new-euconsultations-request-on-alleged-chinese-forced-technology-transfer.html
[https://perma.cc/575V-XN5K].
25. See Miles, supra note 5 (discussing the US practice of blocking the appointment of
Appellate Body members and the crisis this creates for WTO adjudication).
26. For an overview of the crisis, see Manfred Elsig, Mark Pollack & Gregory Shaffer,
Trump is fighting an open war on trade. His stealth war on trade may be even more important.,
WASH. POST (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/
09/27/trump-is-fighting-an-open-war-on-trade-his-stealth-war-on-trade-may-be-even-moreimportant/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.61324096bd9b [https://perma.cc/9KJ9-Z6R3].
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“through asphyxiation.” 27 This approach is very controversial with
major US trade allies who view it as an attack on the stability and
predictability of global trade law. 28 As this Essay has discussed
elsewhere, this approach to the WTO Appellate Body weakens the
multilateral system in a manner that undermines the United States’
long-term interests. 29 In addition, this fight is needlessly weakening
support for the US push against Chinese trade practices by outraging
trading allies who could provide useful support for US pressure.
This Essay aims to highlight that the Trump Administration’s
approach is not a useful method of “reforming” the WTO Appellate
Body’s jurisprudence. 30 At the outset, it is not clear that the Trump
Administration is interested in reforms that would strengthen the WTO
Appellate Body rather than simply effectively killing it. The Trump
Administration has not presented the WTO Dispute Settlement Body
with any conditions for removing its block of Appellate Body
members’ appointments. This indicates that the United States is more
interested in eliminating the ability of the WTO to rule on trade dispute
entirely, rather than promoting a few key changes. 31
Second, most of the jurisprudential changes that the United States
would like to see in the interpretation of anti-dumping, countervailing
duties, and safeguards law could be negotiated with other WTO
members without threatening the WTO Appellate Body’s continued
27. See Farewell Speech of Appellate Body Member Ricardo Ramírez-Hernandez, WORLD
TRADE ORG. (May 28, 2018), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ricardoramirez
farwellspeech_e.htm [https://perma.cc/UG9L-WRV3].
28. See Bruce Baschuk, EU Blasts Trump Trade Policy for ‘Crisis’ at WTO, Risk to
Growth, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-17/
eu-blasts-trump-trade-policy-for-crisis-at-wto-risk-to-growth; Shawn Donnan and Benedict
Mander, Trump Attack on WTO Sparks Backlash from Members, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2018),
https://www.ft.com/content/3e05f236-dd72-11e7-a8a4-0a1e63a52f9c.
29. See Brewster, WTO Dispute Settlement, supra note 2, at 64-65; see also Brewster, The
Trump Administration and the Future of the WTO, supra note 2, at 1.
30. See John Brinkley Trump’s WTO Ambassador Would Rather Fight Than Talk, FORBES
(Oct.
16,
2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnbrinkley/2018/10/16/trumps-wtoambassador-would-rather-fight-than-talk/#25dc4cf975d6
[https://perma.cc/FK3A-XMSB]
(discussing the American ambassador to the WTO Dennis Shea’s comments that the Trump
Administration is showing leadership in reforming the WTO dispute settlement).
31. President Trump has also repeatedly expressed his view that the WTO dispute
settlement system is biased against the United States and that the United States always loses
litigation before the WTO. See John Brinkley, Trump is Quietly Trying to Vandalize the WTO,
FORBES (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnbrinkley/2017/11/27/trumpquietly-trying-to-vandalize-the-wto/#40d4b286263f [https://perma.cc/6HUW-LPBV]. These
statements do not help the perception of the global audience that the Trump Administration is
dedicated to meaningful reform.

2019] TRUMP ADMINSTRATION INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1427
existence. 32 The Appellate Body does not perform “constitutional
review” in the way that US lawyers understand it, meaning that the
Appellate Body does not have final say on the meaning of trade law. 33
Rather, the Appellate Body simply attempts to interpret existing WTO
Agreements. 34 As a result, no past Appellate Body decision would have
precedential value (formally or informally) over a change to the text of
a negotiated agreement by the WTO membership. 35 Thus, the
Appellate Body need not be convinced—by the threat of nonexistence—to change its jurisprudence for the trajectory of trade law to
change in the future. This can all be accomplished by amending the text
of the relevant agreement. While WTO negotiations are never easy,
small changes to the language of a few agreements is much easier than
undertaking an entirely new agreement.
Third, this sets a terrible precedent going forward. Any nation can
block the consensus for appointing or re-appointing an Appellate Body
member, 36 and thus other WTO members may well follow suit,
attempting to shut down the Appellate Body whenever they have
disagreements with the body’s jurisprudence. The end result may be a
move to a majority voting process for WTO Appellate Body
members, 37 which would weaken the United States’ influence over the
appointment of Appellate Body members in normal times.
IV. NARROWING NATIONAL SECURITY CLAIMS
Although the United States has many national security concerns,
previous administrations have been very careful not to use national
32. See Hillman, How to Make the Trade War Even Worse, supra note 5 (noting that the
Trump Administration’s primary complaint against the WTO Appellate Body concerns their
decisions on unfair trade practices, which is the umbrella term for antidumping, countervailing
duty, and safeguards rules).
33. For a fuller examination of the similarities and differences between American judicial
review and Appellate Body judicial review, see Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Judicial Review in the
United States and in the WTO: Some Similarities and Differences,
36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 587, 595-605 (2004).
34. In doing so, it only compares the member countries actions to the agreed trade law.
Carlos Vazquez refers to this as “the least controversial form” of judicial review. See id. at 595.
35. See id. at 596-98 (noting that the WTO Appellate Body does not have any power to
review substantive WTO trade law for consistency with broader constitutional rules.).
36. The DSU agreement defines consensus existing “if no Member, present at the meeting
of the DSB when the decision is taken, formally objects.” See Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, n. 1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401.
37. See Pieter Jan Kuijper, The US Attack on the WTO Appellate Body, 45 LEGAL ISSUES
ECON. INTEGRATION (forthcoming).
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security as a rationale for economic protectionism. In fact, the United
States has not used its domestic statutory authorization—so-called
Section 232 measures—to impose tariffs due to national security since
1986, a decade before the creation of the WTO. 38 The reason for this
self-control is that national security presents a huge loophole for trade
rules, large enough to destroy the trade regime. If nations make very
broad national security claims—as the Trump Administration has done
in the steel and aluminum cases—then other states can follow suit.
The Trump Administration is currently considering extending
tariffs to automobile imports under the guise of national security. 39 The
US Department of Commerce has submitted a report to President
Trump that may provide the grounds for imposing duties on imported
cars, including those coming from allied countries such as Germany,
Japan, and South Korea. 40 President Trump will have ninety days to act
on this report and authorize tariffs, if the report does find imported
automobiles to be a national security threat. 41 Imposing automobile
tariffs would be a step in the wrong direction. Instead of narrowing our
national security claims, such a trade measure would further extend the
precedent for applying tariffs to industries with only tenuous national
security ties but clear political ties. This would weaken the stability of
the multilateral trading system and harm the long-term economic
interests of the United States.
V. RE-ENGAGING THE TRANSPACIFIC PARTNERSHIP
AGREEMENT
Finally, the United States should engage with the countries that
have formed the CPTPP. 42 The Trump Administration withdrew from
38. Chad P. Bown, Trump has announced massive aluminum and steel tariffs. Here are 5
things you need to know, WASH. POST (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
monkey-cage/wp/2018/03/01/trump-has-announced-massive-aluminum-and-steel-tariffs-hereare-5-things-you-need-to-know/?utm_term=.0cae76b79007 [https://perma.cc/DZ3K-ZA64].
39. See Richard Bravo, Trade War Heats Up as EU Vows to Retaliate on U.S. Auto Tariffs,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 18, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-18/tradewar-heats-up-as-eu-vows-to-retaliate-on-u-s-auto-tariffs.
40. Andrew Mayeda, Jenny Leonard, & Richard Bravo, Trump will decide if auto imports
are a national security threat, as EU retaliation looms, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 18, 2019),
https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-trump-auto-tariffs-20190218-story.html
[https://perma.cc/RFC6-QFQS].
41. Id.
42. For a discussion of the differences between the CPATPP and the TPP, see Matthew P.
Goodman, From TPP to CPTPP, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (Mar. 8, 2018),
https://www.csis.org/analysis/tpp-cptpp [https://perma.cc/8G4Q-FQDL].
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the TPP negotiations in 2016, but the agreement came into force
without the United States’ participation in 2018. 43 While the agreement
dropped many US policy priorities when the United States left the
negotiations, including intellectual property provisions and investment
issues, the new agreement continues to promote liberalized trade
among China’s neighbors. 44
The United States needs to engage these countries and this trade
agreement as a means to structure the trajectory of Pacific trade
relations. While China and the United States are the largest economies
in the region, the engagement of Japan, South Korea, Australia, and
Mexico will be important in shoring up any US-Chinese negotiated
outcome. The Obama Administration explicitly viewed the TPP as a
means to constrain China’s regional influence. 45 Such a multilateral
approach is necessary to maintain pressure on China. Even if many
trade negotiations are bilateral, gaining multilateral support among
Pacific countries for the outcome is critical to their successful
implementation.
VI. CONCLUSION
US trade policy can confront real concerns while maintaining the
integrity of the existing multilateral system. In crafting a sophisticated
and strategic trade policy, the United States must address trade disputes
without threatening the stability of the trading order that the United
States has carefully built over the last two decades. Framing USChinese trade negotiations as being outside of the WTO Agreements
can accomplish both tasks by maximizing our bargaining freedom with
China and minimizing the appearance of unilateralism in trade
negotiations. However, to make this strategy work, the United States
must return to supporting the multilateral trade system by ending the
WTO Appellate Body crisis and narrowing its national security trade
measures. These measures would strengthen the multilateral system.
43. Nicole L. Freiner, Pacific Trade Norms Established as US Producers Fear Losses,
DIPLOMAT (Jan. 11, 2019), https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/pacific-trade-norms-establishedas-us-producers-fear-losses/ [https://perma.cc/CE45-KD6G] (discussing the entry into force of
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Additionally, re-engaging in regional trade negotiations in the Pacific
would further reinforce these principles in the region and help influence
the trajectory of the United States’ evolving trade relationships there.

